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About:
Warsaw Euro-Atlantic Summer Academy (WEASA) is an educational 
programme for the up-and-coming policy analysts, experts, advisers, 
civil servants, private sector/NGO professionals and journalists from the 
Eastern Partnership region (i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine).
WEASA was founded to present the political, social and economic 
foundations of modern democracies in the European Union and the 
transatlantic community and further promote the values of freedom, 
pluralism and peace.
WEASA goes in line with the Eastern Partnership initiative that aims 
at accelerating political association, deepening economic integration, 
enhancing mobility of citizens and strengthening sectoral cooperation 
between the European Union and the Eastern Europe.
About
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WEASA Founders
 
The College of Europe is one of the longest established 
educational institutions offering one-year postgraduate European 
studies programmes. Today, the Natolin Campus is at the cutting edge 
of academic study of new developments in the European Union, the 
EU’s relations with its neighbours and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP). In 2012, the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair was 
established at the Natolin campus to respond to the increasing needs for 
a more comprehensive appreciation of the integration process, coupled 
with the understanding of the EU’s relations with the neighbours. Thanks 
to scholarships offered by the European Commission and a number of 
EU Member States, the Natolin Campus hosts a continuously growing 
number of students coming from the ENP countries.
www.coleurope.eu
 
The Polish-American Freedom Foundation was established in 
the U.S. by the Polish-American Enterprise Fund (PAEF). In 2000, the 
Foundation opened its Representative Office in Poland. The Foundation 
finances its activities from revenues generated by its endowment, the 
source of which is the Polish-American Enterprise Fund. The Fund has 
so far transferred $250 million to the endowment. Since 2000, the 
Foundation has disbursed more than $140 million for its programs. 
The Polish-American Freedom Foundation acts to bolster civil society, 
democracy and market economy in Poland, including efforts to promote 
equal opportunities for personal and social development. At the same 
time, it supports transformation processes in other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe. The Foundation pursues its goals through programs 
implemented in the following areas: initiatives in education, development 
of local communities, sharing the Polish experiences in transformation. In 
Poland, the Foundation focuses on initiatives that help level the playing 
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field in education as well as unleash and reinforce citizens’ potential, 
particularly in villages and small towns. The Foundation’s programs are 
designed and conducted with the active participation of third sector 
institutions, which assume the role of managers of the PAFF’s programs.
www.en.pafw.pl
 
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens 
transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges 
and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this 
by supporting individuals and institutions working in the transatlantic 
sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business 
communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic 
topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed 
commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF 
supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded 
in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from 
Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF 
maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition 
to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, 
Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has 
smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WEASA Founders
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Euro-Atlantic support to Eastern Partnership countries on 
Regional Policy and Development: Introduction 
 
Hrant Kostanyan
Years 2015-2016 witnessed rising levels of instability and complexity 
in the Eastern Partnership region caused by both internal and external 
factors. In this environment, both the Quadrennial Review (QDDR 
2015) and the review of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
(Commission 2015b) declare the promotion of regional cooperation as 
one of priorities of their respective development assistance activities.
The Ukraine crisis has not abated and continues to threaten the 
country’s statehood and development, while the government has been 
attempting to push through reforms. There is increasing concerns 
regarding the Moldova’s pro-European orientation, especially following 
the recent presidential elections, which were won by pro-Russian Igor 
Dodon. Georgia, while nominally still following the pro-Western course, 
has seen an economic deterioration and internal political tensions, often 
along the lines of increasing presence of pro-Russian interest groups. 
With the aim of balancing its membership of the Eurasian Economic 
Union, Armenia is actively negotiating a new framework agreement 
with the EU. While Azerbaijan is adjusting to the drop in oil prices, the 
EU adopted a mandate for the European Commission to negotiate a 
comprehensive agreement with the Republic of Azerbaijan. Moreover, 
there are concerns about human rights situation in Azerbaijan. Belarus 
oscillates, uncomfortably, between its relations with Russia and cautious 
attempts to improve the relations with the EU. Following the recent 
parliamentary election, the EU has lifted most of its sanctions against 
Belarus. 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are on course to implement the 
Association Agreements and DCFTAs while Armenia and Belarus are 
members of the Eurasian Economic Union and Azerbaijan remains 
unaligned. 
The above challenges notwithstanding, to varying degrees Eastern 
Partnership countries have continued on their respective paths to 
economic development and political reforms. The 2015 Eastern 
Partnership Riga Summit confirmed that “enabling functioning market 
economies, improving macroeconomic stability and the business 
environment, as well as enhancing interconnectivity (…) and people-
to-people contacts open new prospects for cooperation, contributing 
also to trade, growth and competitiveness” (Commission 2015a).
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2015, the year preceding WEASA 2016, was a pivotal year regarding 
the design and formation of the European and US policies and 
instruments that EaP could benefit from. In August 2015, the Quadrennial 
Diplomacy and Development Review was published, and set the 
priorities for the US diplomatic and development agenda for the next 5 
years. In November 2015, the European Neighbourhood Policy Review 
was unveiled, delineating changes in EU’s policies towards Europe’s 
neighbouring countries and regions, including the Eastern Partnership.
It is in the strategic and current interests of the Euro-Atlantic 
community to support the EaP countries in their strife for peace, 
security, maintenance of sovereignty and continuing their paths towards 
successful democratic transition. For the sake of regional stability and 
development, none of the 6 EaP countries should be left behind as far 
as support is concerned, even if the modalities and intensity of this 
support might differ due to its “tailor made” character.  
Some priority areas outlined in the two reviews coincide (e.g. 
economic growth, regional development, democratization, good 
governance, trade, security, conflict prevention or mitigation). As for 
providing their support to the partner countries, both policy reviews 
have underlined the priority of cooperation with civil societies and 
officials involved in local governance. Whilst central governments remain 
the key partners, the role of grassroots organizations as well as local 
communities and network organizations is going to grow. Therefore, 
there is a need to develop human capital also at the local level. 
Against this backdrop, the Warsaw Euro-Atlantic Summer Academy 
(WEASA) 2016 – co-organized by the College of Europe Natolin 
Campus, the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Polish-
American Freedom Foundation – was devoted to the issue of “Regional 
Policy and Development: Euro-Atlantic Support to Eastern Partnership 
Countries (Dialogue on the New Architecture)”. Both the ENP Review 
and the Quadrennial Review declare the promotion of regional 
cooperation as one of the priorities of their respective development 
assistance activities. 
Further enhancement of regional policies and development in the 
Eastern Partnership countries will strengthen their economic growth, 
develop trade, deepen the economic cooperation, investment in 
infrastructure including transport, reaching out to disadvantaged areas 
and setting up communication channels between national, regional 
and local authorities. Moreover, well-developed contacts and constant 
communication between the neighbouring countries help to prevent 
the unexpected rise of tensions of different nature.
Regional development and cross-border programmes of external 
Euro-Atlantic support to Eastern Partnership countries...
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support, while having a great potential for impacts in many fields and 
sectors listed above, can also face challenges as they involve multiple, 
geographically spread locations and multiple stakeholders from different 
levels of government in multi-country programmes. Understanding such 
type of programmes enhances the ability to successfully design and 
implement them in the future, thus contributing to economic and social 
development of the respective countries.   
This volume is one of the WEASA 2016 follow-up activities and 
focuses on enhancing the alumni intellectual potential. The volume 
consists of five policy-oriented articles authored by the participants 
and lecturers of WEASA 2016. 
While analysing public consultation process of the 2015 review of 
the ENP, Frédéric Schwandt argues that despite the introduction of 
concepts such as “stabilisation” and “differentiation”, the ENP is likely to 
balance between the EU’s values and interests. 
The development dimension of the ENP is rather specific and is 
a mix of elements of the Lomé and the enlargement model of EU aid. 
In her contribution, Fabienne Bossuyt sketches the EU’s ENP-related 
aid instruments and modalities focusing, in particular, on the assistance 
provided under the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). One of 
the main forms of the EU’s support to the neighbourhood countries is 
channelled through cross-border cooperation. Based on the ideas of 
cross border cooperation in Europe, Rafał Sadowski analyses the EU 
cross-border cooperation approaches and modalities in relation to 
Eastern Partnership countries. 
Taking into account consequences of the conflict, Inna Semenenko 
proposes a strategy for Luhansk regional development. She proposes to 
focus on the agricultural sector, chemical and petrochemical industry, 
energy security and restoration of infrastructure. In order to stimulate local 
democracy by properly exercising local self-governance principles, 
Archil Zhorzholiani argues for a need to reform the majoritarian system 
of Georgian Parliament. Development is a challenge especially in the 
areas where there is an ongoing military action. 
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Lessons from Jean Monnet and Thomas Hobbes: 
the 2015 review of the European Neighbourhood Policy and 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Frédéric Schwandt
Abstract
This paper describes the 2015 review of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, in particular its public consultation process and 
the main changes of the policy. It argues that the ENP review formed 
part of a more general coming of age of the EU’s self-perception in 
foreign policy matters. It explains the review’s underlying concept of 
’stabilisation’ and describes how ’differentiation’ could be applied in 
practice. The paper concludes that policymakers will likely be guided 
by an approach where both values and interests guide EU action.
In 2003, a paper called ’Wider Europe’ presented the vision of 
a shared space of stability, prosperity, and security in the countries 
bordering the Member States of the European Union in the East and in 
the South. The EU had just enlarged to 25 Member States and, leading 
by the power of its example, it would propose ’everything but institutions’ 
in order to create a ’ring of friends’ and to ’avoid drawing new dividing 
lines in Europe’.
For over a decade the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
would be the cornerstone of EU external action in the region. Through 
this policy the EU applied the method that it knew best, which ensured 
its own success and peacefully united countries recovering from 
authoritarian rule and war: incremental reform steps, applied in small 
quantities but consistently and thoroughly, leading to positive spill-
over effects, and ultimately to market integration and harmonisation of 
standards.
Thus, the ENP became a proto EU foreign policy pursued towards 
partner countries closest to the EU. 1 The Lisbon Treaty even codified a 
’special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an 
area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of 
the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on 
cooperation’ (Art. 8 TEU).
However, while the Lisbon Treaty abandoned the pillar structure 
of the EU and introduced, notably, the ’double-hattedness’ of the High 
1 With the exception of candidate countries, EEA countries and Switzerland, for which different 
frameworks apply.
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Representative and Vice President of the Commission, the ENP and the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) were de facto followed in 
parallel, as two distinct policies.
This changed in 2015. The ’ring of friends’ was now a ’ring of fire’ and 
arguably the ENP had become one of the most criticised policies of the 
EU: an abstract, highly technical policy run by experts, a neighbourhood 
which was ’in shambles’, and a policy that needed a ’reset’ as crisis had 
become ’the new normal’. The European Commission and EU Member 
States agreed and asked for a review of the policy – the second revision 
after the 2011 review following the events of the Arab Spring.
Consulting stakeholders
A public consultation (European Commission 2015) was organised 
by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission’s 
newly created DG NEAR. Over 250 contributions were received by 
a large variety of stakeholders, including Member States, partner 
countries, civil society, academia and think tanks, business, and the 
public at large. This was probably the first time a foreign policy matter 
had been submitted to an EU wide public consultation.
In April 2015, a first set of Council Conclusions on the ENP review 
stated that ’[t]he ENP is key for both the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and other areas of the EU’s external action. The 
neighbourhood is a strategic priority and a fundamental interest for the 
EU’ (Council 2015).
It is worth looking at the Council’s words in detail.
For the first time in more than ten years of implementing the policy 
it was clearly spelled out – if proof thereof was needed – that the ENP 
was a foreign policy of the EU, combining elements of both CFSP and EU 
external action. The neighbourhood is referred to as a strategic priority 
and a fundamental interest for the EU. This represents a significant shift 
in discourse when compared to the original policy. The projection of 
soft power of the earlier years (’friends’, ’avoid dividing lines’) shifted 
towards a leaner approach also based on self-interest (’strategic’, 
’interests’).
How did this happen?
The results of the public consultation on ENP review were in many 
aspects remarkable. As part of the consultation two ’existential’ questions 
were submitted to stakeholders: (1) should the policy be scrapped 
altogether? and (2), should the policy be split into two policies for the 
East and the South, respectively?
Lessons from Jean Monnet and Thomas Hobbes Lessons from Jean Monnet and Thomas Hobbes
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Surprisingly, very few stakeholders argued for the policy to be 
abandoned. No Member State and no partner country put forth such 
a position. On the contrary: partner countries that had repeatedly 
expressed scepticism towards closer engagement with the EU over 
preceding years were among the most eager respondents to the 
consultation. Not having a relation with the EU was an option that no 
partner country was ready to consider. Quite the contrary, as all of 
them sought closer relations with the EU – but in different ways.
Regarding the other ’existential’ question, surprisingly few 
stakeholders argued for a ’split’ of the policy. This was unexpected 
following years of discourse on the ENP being too EU-centric and 
following controversy over the very term of ’neighbourhood’ – 
considered by many to be condescending towards partner countries. 
Most stakeholders agreed that keeping the policy together had merit.
Indeed the ENP is not only a foreign policy but above all it reflects 
internal EU dynamics, including the geographic situation of Member 
States and historical ties with neighbouring countries. A common 
neighbourhood policy is crucial for the unity and effectiveness of 
EU action in the region. However unintuitive the bundling of the EU’s 
resources allocated to the East and to the South may seem, few have 
objected to the premise that several neighbourhood policies would 
yield different, less convincing results.
A newly found focus on interests? 
A state, and be it a present-day EU Member State, will quite naturally 
tend to its national interest in foreign policy matters. For the EU however, 
being a post-modern political construction still in development, it is not 
a natural thing to say that, yes, it does have interests abroad and that, 
yes, it will pursue those interests.
In that sense the ENP review formed part of a more general coming 
of age of the EU’s self-perception. It is hardly a coincidence that the 
EU’s stance in the world was given a broader overhaul almost in parallel, 
the result of which was published one year later through the Global 
Strategy. Following the bitter lessons of having to put the EU’s soft 
power into perspective both at home and abroad, it became clear that 
applying the Monnet method in an increasingly Hobbesian environment 
was in many cases a dead-end.
A new paradigm was needed. Against the bleak picture of conflict, 
rising extremism and terrorism, it was not difficult to determine that 
the top priority for the years to come should be stabilisation of the 
neighbourhood. This, however, is more complex a concept than it may 
seem.
Lessons from Jean Monnet and Thomas Hobbes
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First, the new maxim of ’stabilisation’ contrasts with the original 
mantra of ’stability, prosperity, and security’ in the region. Moreover, in the 
2011 review, Europe’s perceived proximity to leaders in neighbourhood 
countries where the Arab Spring had made a strong impact was a major 
point of criticism.
How can a renewed focus on stabilisation work in this context? If 
we concede that the functionalist logic of step-by-step reform goals 
risks becoming redundant in a situation of conflict or even war, then 
the logical conclusion is that we must take a step back and stabilise 
that situation in order to create the political, economic, and security 
environment that will allow reforms to take place. This applies a fortiori 
when considering that some reforms, in particular the far reaching ones, 
carry costs in the short term that require a society and an economy to 
be resilient enough to offset these costs. Stabilisation, therefore, needs 
to be seen as an enabling factor creating the conditions for reforms to 
take place, once possible. The reviewed ENP adopted stabilisation as 
its main objective for the years to come, as a precondition for the EU’s 
reform agenda.
In addition, the review also acknowledged for the first time that 
not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards. The original ENP 
worked on the assumption that all partners were interested in some 
form of ’approximation’ with EU norms. Over the years some partners 
have expressed their clear willingness and ability to work as closely 
as possible with the EU, while others have chosen a different path. 
The principle of ’differentiation’ – i.e. of designing a regional policy 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate individual situations – was part 
of the ENP’s DNA from the very beginning. However, the concept was 
difficult to apply over the years, also due to resource constraints on the 
European side.
Applying differentiation will mean, in practice, that the relations 
between the EU and partners will become more complex. Instead of 
offering one model of engagement based mostly on the EU acquis, 
relations with partners2 will in future reflect the depth and the breadth 
of cooperation and jointly agreed reform objectives. Some partners 
will benefit from extensive cooperation formats such as the Association 
Agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas concluded 
with some partners  in the East. Others will prefer a much more focused 
relationship under older Action Plans or newly developed Partnership 
Priorities – policy documents which are intended to inform cooperation 
and EU support for the years to come. The EU’s action in the region 
will become more ’à la carte’ in order to account for the diversity of 
choices in the neighbourhood.
2 Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine.
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In this context it has become increasingly evident that the EU is not 
the only game in town, and the review recognised that the EU’s leverage 
in the region was often limited. It is therefore not surprising that some 
neighbourhood partners perceive the need to pursue a multi-vector 
diplomacy that also accounts for other factors in the wider region. This 
development is not necessarily to be frowned upon. In some cases, 
partners seizing opportunities extended to them can contribute to the 
overall objectives of the EU in the region. In this respect the EU leads 
by example – could there be a stronger expression of soft power than 
emphasising that partners have to make their own sovereign choices in 
the region?
Thus the review focused on stabilisation, building on tailor made 
arrangements with partner countries that should express the interests 
and needs of both sides, thereby increasing the ownership of the 
policy by partners themselves. A Joint Communication by the High 
Representative and the Commission of November 2015 (Commission 
2015) as well as a second set of Council conclusions of December 2015 
(Coundil 2015) present these proposals in detail.
Balancing values and interests
One further policy shift needs to be pointed out. Since its 
beginning, the ENP has been a value-driven policy and its focus on 
reforms naturally included efforts to improve democracy, the rule of 
law and fundamental freedoms. This has not changed. However, the 
review’s proposals on an interest-based foreign policy and tailor-made 
partnerships not only based on EU rules and standards raised questions 
as regards the policy’s focus on values. This, of course, had to be seen 
in the context of a largely deteriorating human rights record in many 
neighbourhood countries.
Like the discussion on differentiation, the debate on ’values versus 
interests’ is as old as the ENP itself. It is underpinned by the perception 
of the EU’s role as a normative, transformative power. Reform processes, 
however, require full ownership by neighbourhood partners – and the 
EU’s ability to leverage reform processes is strongly conditioned by the 
willingness and ability of local elites to engage with a genuine agenda 
for change.
Following the 2011 review of the ENP, a slogan as simple as ’more 
for more’ became one of the major trademarks of the policy. However, 
its initial meaning – as enshrined in the regulation on the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument – i.e. ’more financial support in exchange 
for more reforms’ quickly became subject to misinterpretation.
Lessons from Jean Monnet and Thomas Hobbes
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The expression was indeed so simple that ’more of anything’ could 
become the condition for ’more of anything else’. As interpretations 
diverged, the expression often antagonised partners and Member 
States, and it was soon used by a multitude of stakeholders in a variety 
of ways (’less for less’). The review reframed the initial expression by 
bringing it back to its original meaning: the closely defined context of 
the ENI regulation. Nonetheless, what was meant to serve as a tool of 
persuasion under the ’incentive-based approach’ has de facto become 
an acknowledgment of reform processes successfully carried out, 
thereby limiting the leverage it was intended to create.
The reviewed policy thus continues to apply the incentive-based 
approach which builds on the willingness and ability of partners 
to reform. The review also strongly emphasises the EU’s continued 
commitment to universal values. The difficulty for policy makers naturally 
lies in overcoming the dichotomy of ’values vs interests’, working towards 
an approach where ’values and interests’ guide EU action. Readers of 
the classics are likely to agree that this is indeed a dilemma as old as 
the concept of foreign policy itself.
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Development cooperation and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy3 
Fabienne Bossuyt
Abstract 
This policy paper focuses on the development cooperation 
dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). It starts with 
contextualization of the EU’s assistance under the ENP, which – as 
will be shown – brings together elements of the Lomé model and the 
enlargement model of EU aid. Next, it outlines the aid instruments that 
the EU uses to provide assistance to the ENP countries. This is followed 
by an overview of the different aid modalities. The remainder of the 
paper gives an overview of the assistance provided under the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the different programmes through 
which the funding is offered.
Between development and enlargement
The European Union (EU)’s aid to its Eastern and Southern 
neighbourhood has increased significantly in the past 15 years. In 
2014, more than 20 per cent of the Official Development Aid (ODA) 
granted by the EU institutions went to the 16 ENP countries, compared 
to 16 per cent in 2007 and 11 per cent in 2000.4 Since the EU is in 
principle committed to prioritizing the least-developed countries (see 
e.g. European Commission 2011), developmentalists have criticized 
this trend: as the ENP countries are obviously of key interest to the EU, 
they see this steady increase in aid spending as an indication of the 
securitization of the EU’s development policy. 
3 This paper is based on the book chapter ‘Aid in the European Neighbourhood Policy’, which is 
due to appear in the Routledge Handbook on the ENP (edited by Tobias Schumacher et al.). 
I am grateful for the input of Hrant Kostanyan, Jan Orbie and Bruno Vandecasteele, who co-
authored that chapter with me. 
4 Data are retrieved from the OECD-DAC database, available at https://stats.oecd.org. 
Lome model
Interaction between trade and aid, 
in view of economic development
Lomé light in MENA region since 1970s Enlargement light in former Soviet 
countries since 1991
Focus on exporting the 
‘acquis communautaire’
Enlargement model
Facilitating transition from communist 
system towards liberal democracy 
and market-oriented economy
 ENPI/ENI since 2007:
Combines typical enlargement assistance modalities (Twinning, SIGMA  & TAIEX) with
typical development aid modalities (grants, budget support and loans)
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Two ‘models’ of EU aid exist (Table 1). Each of them has a distinctive 
background and finality as originated in the history of European 
integration. On the one hand, the ‘Lomé model’ focuses on the interaction 
between trade and aid, with the purpose of economic development. 
The idea behind the Lomé model is that poverty should be addressed 
by providing exclusive trade and aid benefits. This model was originally 
designed for the EU’s aid to the countries of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) group. The ACP countries received preferential access 
to the European market, and the European Development Fund (EDF) 
provided aid that was exclusively targeted to these countries.
Interestingly, the EU applied a ‘light version’ of this Lomé model to 
the EU’s southern neighbourhood partner countries. In the 1970s, the EU 
concluded a series of preferential trade agreements with the Maghreb 
and Mashreq countries as part of the EU’s Global Mediterranean 
Policy (Mishalani et al. 1981). This was accompanied with financial 
assistance aimed mostly at supporting economic development. The 
special relationship with the Southern Mediterranean countries was 
reinvigorated in 1995 with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also 
known as “Barcelona Process”, which included an economic and financial 
partnership involving preferential free trade agreements as well as 
additional funding through the MEDA (Mesures d’accompagnement) 
programme, then a newly-established fund exclusively for the Southern 
Mediterranean region. The fund was targeted explicitly at instigating 
liberal economic reform and integrating the countries economically 
with Europe, premised on the idea that economic development is the 
key driver of poverty reduction (see e.g. Holden 2008).
On the other hand, there is the ‘enlargement model’, which focuses 
on extending the EU acquis towards the neighbourhood countries. It 
finds its origins in the process that led up to the 2004/2007 ‘big bang’ 
enlargement of the EU. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, the EU extended the already existing assistance programmes 
‘Poland and Hungary Assistance for Restructuring their Economies’ 
(PHARE) to those countries in Central and Eastern Europe that were 
likely to join the EU in the medium-to-long term. The main purpose was 
to facilitate the transition from communist systems towards democratic 
and market-oriented economies. This would be done by integrating 
these countries into the economic and political space of the EU. For 
the (other) countries of the former Soviet Union, the EU established 
the ‘Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States’ (TACIS) programme. TACIS can be seen as a ‘light’ version 
of the enlargement/PHARE model, aimed at facilitating political 
and economic transition based on the EU’s model without, however, 
providing a prospect of membership to the EU.
With the launch of the ENP in 2004 bringing together the EU’s 
Southern and Eastern neighbours under one umbrella framework, also 
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the financial instruments were merged. The European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) – as well as its successor, the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) – encompasses elements of both 
‘Southern development’ and ‘enlargement acquis’ models, although the 
latter clearly became dominant. Indeed, the basic thrust of the ENP is 
‘enlargement without institutions’ (Kelley 2006), which implies a focus 
on exporting the EU acquis with a view to integration in the European 
economic and political space, ultimately fostering regional stability and 
avoiding new dividing lines. 
The merger of both ‘models’ within ENPI/ENI is also clearly visible at 
the level of the instrument’s aid modalities in the fact that it relies both 
on typical enlargement assistance modalities, in particular Twinning, 
SIGMA5  and TAIEX6 , and on typical development aid modalities, namely 
project-based grants, budget support and concessional loans. 
Instruments
Most of the EU’s aid allocated to the ENP countries comes from the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)7 , which is exclusively used 
for the 16 ENP countries. For the period 2014-2020, the ENI has been 
allocated EUR 15.433 billion (2013). This is a further increase compared 
to the EUR 12 billion allocated through the ENPI to ENP countries in the 
period 2007-2013, which was already a 32 per cent increase compared 
to the TACIS and MEDA aid provided to these countries between 2000 
and 2006 (European Commission 2014).
Funding through the ENI covers four categories of assistance: 
bilateral assistance for ENP countries, regional assistance to the Southern 
and Eastern Neighbourhood, neighbourhood-wide programmes and 
Cross Border Cooperation Programmes (see more below). 
Next to ENI, ENP countries are also eligible for funding from 
several other EU external assistance instruments. It concerns mostly the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Civil 
Society Organisations and Local Authorities (CSO/LA) programme, the 
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IfSP) and the European 
Endowment for Democracy. 
The most widely used of these is the EIDHR, although its overall 
budget is relatively limited. The EIDHR is the EU’s specific tool for 
providing financial support to civil society actors engaged in issues 
5 SIGMA stands for ‘Support for Improvement in Governance and Management’
6 TAIEX stands for ‘Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument’.
7 In 2014, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) succeeded the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which was operational from 2007 until 2013.
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of human rights and democratic development. Unlike the EU’s other 
international cooperation instruments, EIDHR operates without the 
need for consent from the target countries’ governments. The EIDHR 
funds are disbursed mainly through calls for proposals initiated by 
the European Commission’s headquarters – at global level for (cross)
regional macro-projects – and by EU delegations – at local level for 
micro-projects (called Country-Based Support Schemes). A portion of 
the funds is distributed without calls for proposals, inter alia, for election 
observation, but also for individual grants to human rights activists in the 
countries where they are under most pressure.
In terms of allocations at country level, the EU tends to prioritize 
countries where the impact of the EIDHR activities has more chances 
of success, which means that more authoritarian countries are allocated 
less funding than more open countries. When it comes to the focus of 
the projects, research on EIDHR has shown that most of the funding 
goes to projects centered on relatively uncontroversial issues such as 
women’s and children’s rights (Bicchi and Voltolini 2013).
Unlike EIDHR, the European Endowment for Democracy is an 
independent private law foundation funded mostly by EU member states. 
It provides grants to pro-democratic individuals and organizations in the 
ENP countries: NGOs, movements, activists, young leaders, independent 
media, and journalists. Grants have been awarded, for instance, to the 
European Radio for Belarus (Euroradio) and to a group of local youth 
organizations in Azerbaijan for organizing trainings to foster critical 
thinking and empowerment among Azerbaijan’s youth.
The CSO/LA programme, in turn, is a thematic programme of the 
Development Cooperation Instrument. It provides support to civil society 
and local authorities, among others in ENP countries, to strengthen 
their contributions towards reinforced governance, accountability and 
inclusive policy-making. 
Finally, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace aims at 
preventing and responding to crises and creating a safe and stable 
environment in partner countries. With this instrument, the EU funded, 
for instance, the ‘Media for Peace-building in Palestine’ project, 
which sought to contribute to the promotion of a culture of tolerance, 
mutual trust and cohesiveness within the Palestinian society through a 
strengthened and competent media. The EU also used this instrument 
to provide support to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.
Aid modalities
The EU relies on several aid modalities to disburse funds to the ENP 
countries. Most of the bilateral assistance under ENI – at least in absolute 
numbers – is provided through budget support, followed by technical 
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assistance. Budget support consists of direct financial transfers to the 
national treasury of the partner country to support reforms in specific 
sectors. The exact share varies strongly between the ENP countries in 
line with their different needs and changing situations. In the case of 
Moldova, for instance, over 50 per cent of the allocated funding in the 
period 2007-2011 was reserved for budget support and the other 50 
per cent were for technical assistance projects (Ratzmann 2012). In 
Egypt, the EU has scaled down the use of budget support in recent years 
because the government has not met the general conditions (European 
Commission 2014). The European Commission argues that it uses budget 
support in order to give ownership to the countries and to “buy” reforms 
from the neighbouring governments. The counterargument is that once 
financial assistance enters into the budget it is very difficult to trace, 
which is problematic considering that many of the ENP countries are 
still faced with high levels of corruption. 
A considerable share of the technical assistance is disbursed in the 
form of grants, i.e. donations provided to third parties (e.g. European 
NGO or local NGO) to carry out a project. Grants are usually provided 
through competitive calls for proposals. Since 2007, the EU also makes 
use of so-called blending mechanisms to provide assistance to the ENP 
region. Through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility, grants from the 
European Commission and the EU member states are ‘blended’ with loans 
from European Financial Institutions, especially the European Investment 
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
For the ENP countries, technical assistance is also provided through 
specific capacity- and institution-building instruments for public 
administrations, namely Twinning, Technical Assistance and Information 
Exchange (TAIEX) and the Support for Improvement in Governance and 
Management (SIGMA).
Twinning was originally designed in 1998 to help candidate countries 
to acquire the necessary skills and experience to adopt, implement and 
enforce EU legislation. It brings together public sector expertise from 
EU member states and ENP countries with the aim of enhancing peer to 
peer activities. Figure 1 provides an overview of the number of Twinning 
projects that were launched in the ENP countries between 2005 and 
2012.
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Source: European Commission (2012)
TAIEX supports public administrations with regard to the 
approximation, application and enforcement of EU legislation, and 
facilitates the sharing of EU best practices. It is largely needs-driven 
and delivers tailor-made expertise to address issues at short notice. 
SIGMA, which is a joint initiative between the EU and the OECD, aims at 
strengthening public management. It is based on a team of 20 experts, 
which provides assistance in six key areas: strategic framework of 
public administration reform; policy development and co-ordination; 
public service and human resource management; accountability; 
service delivery; public financial management, public procurement and 
external audit.
Bilateral assistance under ENI
About 60 per cent of funding under EN(P)I is committed to bilateral 
assistance. About two thirds of ENPI/ENI funds have been committed to 
the ten Southern neighbourhood partner countries and one third to the 
six EaP countries. When calculated per capita (relative to the GDP/
capita), the EU’s funding for the two regions is roughly similar, with the 
EaP region slightly outnumbering the MENA region. 
The EU’s approach of bilateral aid allocation is incentive-based and 
differentiated. The former implies that ENP countries that demonstrate 
a genuine commitment to implementing reforms receive more funding 
from the EU. The latter implies that the EU tailors its assistance to the 
countries’ contexts based on five specific criteria: (1) needs, such as 
level of development and population, (2) progress in political, economic 
and social reforms, (3) commitment to advancing democracy, (4) the 
level of cooperation with the EU and (5) absorption capacity of the 
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recipient country (European Union 2014). Therefore, within the Eastern 
and Southern neighbourhoods, there are substantial differences in the 
aid disbursements at country level and between sectors. 
In 2014, Ukraine (EUR 490 million), Palestine (EUR 481 million) and 
Tunisia (EUR 452 million) received most aid from the EU. Other ENP 
countries were allocated only a fraction of these sums (e.g. Azerbaijan 
EUR 12 million, Belarus EUR 28 million). Calculated per capita, the top 
recipients in 2014 were Palestine (2.07% of GDP/capita), Moldova 
(1.08% of GDP/capita) and Georgia (0.59% of GDP/capita). This 
stands in sharp contrast with countries like Azerbaijan (0.01% of GDP/
capita), Belarus (0.02% of GDP/capita), Egypt (0.03% of GDP/capita) 
and Libya (0.04% of GDP/capita).8   
Looking at the sectors supported under bilateral ENI assistance, 
there are some differences between the Eastern and the Southern 
neighbourhood. For the Southern neighbourhood, the priority sectors 
are economy-related issues (including diversification, labour market, 
private sector), support for democracy, good governance and rule of 
law, and the energy sector. For the Eastern Partnership countries, the 
main sectors supported by the EU are the justice and police sectors, 
public administration reform, and regional/local development and 
agriculture. Most ENP countries receive bilateral assistance for civil 
society support, but the Eastern Partnership countries are allocated 
less funding for civil society support than the Southern Mediterranean 
countries, where this assistance amounts to approx. 20 per cent. 
Other assistance under ENI
Regional assistance
Under ENI, the EU also supports regional programmes towards the 
Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, which are complementary to the 
bilateral policies. The multilateral framework of the EaP consists of four 
thematic platforms: (1) democracy, good governance and stability, (2) 
economic integration and convergence with EU policies, (3) energy 
security, and (4) contacts between people. The platforms aim at 
facilitating the exchange of views and best practices between the EU 
and ENP countries. To support the work of the platforms, the EaP offers 
the possibility to set up expert panels to discuss initiatives, projects 
and activities in depth and to report to their respective platforms. 
The expert panels also focus on the development and implementation 
of so-called Flagship Initiatives, which cover various areas, including 
small and medium size enterprises, energy, environment, prevention, 
preparedness and response to natural and man-made disasters, and 
integrated border management.
8 Data are retrieved from the OECD-DAC database, available at https://stats.oecd.org.
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The UfM goes beyond the countries included in the ENP South 
and brings in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mauritania, Monaco, 
Montenegro and Turkey. The members of the UfM meet in the ‘Platform 
for Regional and Policy Dialogue’ to conduct policy dialogue, exchange 
ideas and experiences, and to formulate priorities. The jointly identified 
strategic priority areas are (1) business development, (2) social and 
civil affairs, (3) higher education and research, (4) transport and urban 
development, (5) water and environment, and (6) energy and climate 
action. 
Neighbourhood-wide assistance
Neighbourhood-wide assistance covers aid channelled 
through programmes that are most appropriate for and effectively 
implementable in the countries of the whole neighbourhood (EEAS 
and European Commission 2014a). The same neighbourhood-wide 
programmes are deployed to all countries participating in the ENP, 
but they can be adjusted; the subsidiarity principle is a prerequisite for 
programmes to be included in the neighbourhood-wide instrument, i.e. 
if the programme is best addressed at the regional level (South or East), 
then it is not delegated to the neighbourhood-wide instrument.
Neighbourhood-wide cooperation programmes include the 
administrative reform and institution-building tools Twinning and 
SIGMA, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), which envisions 
sustainable and inclusive economic development and integration, and 
Erasmus+, which aims at improved student and academic mobility. 
Aid for cross-border cooperation
Cross-border cooperation is part of both the ENP and EU-Russia 
cooperation. It aims to promote cross-border cooperation between 
EU member states, ENP countries and Russia (EEAS and European 
Commission 2014b). The cross-border cooperation programmes cover 
common land borders (e.g. Karelia/Russia, Estonia/Russia, Poland/
Russia, Latvia/Lithuania/Belarus, Romania/Moldova, Romania/Ukraine, 
Poland/Belarus/Ukraine, Hungary/Slovakia/Romania/Ukraine), short 
sea crossings (Italy/Tunisia) and sea basins (Baltic Sea Region, Black 
Sea, Mediterranean Mid-Atlantic). 
Conclusion
The neigbourhood has attracted a growing amount of EU aid, driven 
by the EU’s increased interest in fostering regional stability and avoiding 
new dividing lines at its borders. The assistance that the EU provides to 
the ENP countries exhibits a unique combination of elements of the 
aid model that the EU uses for delivering aid to developing countries 
and the aid model it follows for supporting EU candidate countries. 
As such, a vast array of instruments is at the EU’s disposal, allowing for 
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a wide diversity in terms of programmes, sectors and aid modalities. 
Nevertheless, the EU’s assistance varies strongly between the 16 ENP 
countries, in line with the countries’ domestic situation and needs, as 
well as their eagerness to implement reforms. This variation is likely to 
increase as some countries become closer associated with the EU while 
others show little desire of enhancing cooperation with the EU or are 
torn by internal strife and disarray.
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Cross-border cooperation in the EU’s policy 
towards eastern neighbours
Rafał Sadowski
Abstract
Cross-border cooperation is one of the three major forms of the 
EU’s direct support addressed to its neighbours in the Eastern Europe 
and South Mediterranean (the two others are bilateral and multilateral 
aid). For this purpose the EU has allocated over €1bn under the current 
financial perspective for the period of 2014-2020. The role of cross-
border cooperation is especially important in the case of the EU’s 
eastern neighbours covered by the Eastern Partnership initiative. In this 
case, direct neighbourhood over land border gives more opportunities 
to establish cooperation links at regional and local level between 
bordering regions. This paper aims at briefly presenting the idea of the 
cross-border cooperation in Europe and shows how the EU approaches 
this specific instrument of cooperation and how it is used in practice in 
building relations with the European eastern neighbours. 
Why cross-border cooperation?
Cross-border cooperation, abbreviated to CBC, is an instrument 
for developing cooperation over national borders between adjacent 
regions at regional and local level. Its main aim is to stimulate regional 
development by overcoming obstacles posed by existence of state 
frontiers. Many of the border regions face challenges of economic and 
social development. In many countries regional GDP of border regions 
is smaller than that of central or capital regions. For example, GDP per 
inhabitant measured in purchasing power standards of Poland’s central 
region Mazowieckie is at the level of 107 per cent of the EU’s average, 
while in Lubelskie region, which is located at Poland’s eastern border, 
it is only 47,5 per cent. Also in Slovakia, GDP PPP per capita of the 
capital region Bratislava amounts to 184 per cent of the EU’s average, 
whereas in the eastern region of Vyhodne Slovensko it is only 52 per 
cent (Eurostat 2015). The same situation can also be observed in the 
EU’s eastern neighbouring countries. For instance, in Ukraine, the richest 
regions are central with the capital region of Kyiv at the top, while the 
poorest in the whole country are these located in the west and south-
west of the country, i.e. regions of Volyn, Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi 
(State Statistics Service of Ukraine 2015).
{ 27 }
The peripheral character of border regions creates several 
obstacles for their development. These regions usually have more difficult 
access to goods and services than capital regions. This results in low 
levels of investments, underdeveloped public infrastructure, insufficient 
transport links and brain drain to central and/or capital regions. Border 
regions also face constraints caused by the existence of national 
borders, which create barriers for regional development resulting from 
socio-economic differences and different legal frameworks between 
adjacent border areas. 
Underdevelopment of border regions is not only a challenge 
for local and regional actors and authorities. It also poses problems 
from the perspective of the whole European Union. Border regions 
located along the EU’s eastern and southern frontiers are generally less 
developed and poorer than in the centre and north of the Union (the 
richest EU’s regions are Inner-London, Luxembourg, Brussels-Capital, 
Hamburg). On the one hand, this creates a problem for sustainable 
regional development and cohesion inside the EU. On the other hand, 
the need for social and economic development of border regions is 
also important for reducing problems related to security and stability at 
the EU’s external frontiers. Poverty and underdevelopment could be the 
factors undermining stability and increasing stimulus for crime, including 
cross-border crime.
The answer to these challenges has become the development of 
territorial cooperation. Territorial cooperation could be described as a 
horizontal cooperation at subnational or regional level between local 
communities and regions with the aim of reducing dipartites between 
regions, strengthening cohesion and fostering local economic and 
social development. Cross-border cooperation is one of the three 
basic forms of territorial cooperation. The two others are: transnational 
cooperation and interregional cooperation. Territorial cooperation 
and cross-border cooperation have quite a long history in Europe. The 
first structure for cross-border cooperation was established on the 
German-Dutch borderland in 1958. Since then, CBC has been constantly 
developing and spreading all over the continent. It is applied not only 
in cooperation between regions of the EU member states, but also 
between the EU and its neighbours and even among non-EU states. 
Currently there are over 200 cross-border regions in Europe. 
Territorial cooperation: forms and institutional  
structures
Main forms of territorial cooperation differ by their scale and 
character and are divided into cross-border, transnational and 
interregional cooperation.
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Interregional cooperation refers to activities implemented at 
pan-European level. In practice, it relates to exchange of experience, 
knowledge and best practices between local and regional authorities. It 
could also concern itself with cooperation between non-neighbouring 
regions.
Transnational cooperation concerns joint initiatives, and involves 
local and regional authorities of several countries of a broader 
geographical region (e.g. the Baltic Sea, the Danube river, the Black 
Sea) in cooperation on very special issues, e.g. regional development 
and environmental protection.
Finally, cross-border cooperation refers to cooperation between 
adjacent border regions usually of two or three countries. The aim of 
such interaction is to foster the integrated regional development and 
deal with common challenges and problems for local communities. In 
practice, CBC takes the form of implementation of common initiatives, 
programmes and projects across borders, which serve the needs of 
regions and communities divided by a state border. CBC is the most 
widespread form of territorial cooperation and is characterised by the 
highest level of operational intensity compared to transnational and 
interregional cooperation.
Territorial entities involved in territorial cooperation form a cross-
border region (CBR). CBR could be defined as a region with common 
geography, history, culture and economic potential, but divided by 
national borders.
Territorial cooperation, including cross-border cooperation, can 
take various forms of institutionalisation. The most widespread institutional 
structure of CBC is Euroregions. Euroregions are formed by local or 
regional territorial entities of adjacent regions of two or three countries. 
They have their own decision-making competencies and organisational 
structure with own administration and financial resources. Euroregions 
usually have permanent secretariat and administrative and expert staff. 
They can be established on various legal bases, i.e. 1) informal CBC 
agreement, 2) cross-border cooperation agreements, 3) according 
to private law as foundations or national associations, 4) according to 
public law based on international treaties. Euroregions do not create 
any new administrative level. They operate within competencies given 
to them by local or regional authorities which have established them. 
In their cross-border interactions, Euroregions involve various actors: 
citizens, politicians, officials, businesspeople, civil society activists. 
Activities undertaken by Euroregions should always be oriented towards 
cooperation across borders. They refer to development of long-term 
and strategic cooperation.
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Over the last few years, the EU has developed a more advanced 
form of CBC institutionalisation, which is the European grouping 
of territorial cooperation (EGTC). Its main feature is its own legal 
personality, which allows operating within the same legal framework 
across national borders. EGTCs are established by local or regional 
authorities or other public bodies from different EU member states. The 
idea for establishing EGTC was to create the same legal environment for 
actors involved in the implementation of cross-border activities. One of 
the key problems for local entities engaged in CBC is a different legal 
environment applied on both sides of the national border.  The main 
objective for EGTC is the implementation of territorial cooperation 
programmes and projects and management of the EU funds for this 
purpose. Currently, 55 EGTCs operate in the EU and further 12 are in 
the process of construction. The functioning of EGTC is governed by the 
EU law; therefore,.since the acquis communataire is not applied outside 
the EU in partner countries, the possibilities of EGTC application are 
very limited in cooperation between the EU and non-EU local actors.
CBC in the EU’s toolbox
A distinctive feature of cross-border cooperation is its functional 
character. The EU has always approached CBC as an instrument for 
implementation of its various policies, not as a primary goal of its 
actions. CBC plays an important role both in the intra-EU policies 
and in external actions; however, in both cases it is used with slightly 
different purposes. The aim of CBC within the EU is to foster integration 
and cohesion between EU Member States and to support regional 
development, which contributes to economic and social growth of 
the Union. This relates to achieving an overarching goal of building a 
strong and integrated European Union without internal divisions. Thus, 
CBC is a very important instrument applied in the Cohesion Policy and 
the European Territorial Cooperation goal, whose actions are financed 
from the European Regional and Development Fund. 
In the case of EU’s external policies, CBC is an instrument for 
reducing barriers dividing Europe and developing good and close 
relations with Union’s direct neighbours in order to secure a stable 
neighbourhood. CBC is applied in actions towards two general groups 
of neighbours, i.e. those that are in the process of accession and those 
without membership perspective, but with whom the EU develops 
close and partnership relations. In the former case, the key purpose 
of CBC is to reduce social and economic gaps of accession countries 
with the Union and to prepare them to participate in EU’s community 
policies, especially the territorial and cohesion policy. It relates to the 
Stabilisation and Association Process initiative concerning the Western 
Balkans and Turkey and its financial tool of Instrument for Pre Accession 
Assistance (IPA). In the latter case, the overall goal is to stimulate 
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regional development of border regions and to strengthen social 
and economic ties between the EU’s and partner states’ regions. It 
concerns European Neighbourhood Policy (with its regional dimensions 
of Eastern Partnership and Southern Mediterranean), the EU’s macro-
regional strategies (for the Black Sea region and the Danube region) 
and Strategic Partnership policy with Russia.
Application of CBC in the EU’s activities towards its neighbours
 
Source: author’s own elaboration based on relevant EU’s legal acts
Eastern Partnership and CBC
The EU has been engaged in developing CBC with its eastern 
neighbours since the mid-90s. The first EU programme that supported 
CBC with its eastern neighbours was TACIS-CBC, which was set 
up in 1996 and then replaced by a more sophisticated European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument - ENPI-CBC in 2007. ENPI-
CBC was replaced again by the European Neighbourhood Instrument 
– ENI-CBC in 2013.
Currently, the key political frameworks for EU’s external actions 
towards its eastern neighbours are the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) and the Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP). The latter covers 6 
countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. The ENP involves 16 of the EU’s neighbours in the Eastern Europe, 
South Caucasus, Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The EU 
designed a specific financial tool in order to support implementation 
of the ENP and the EaP, and that is the European Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI). The EU’s support through ENI consists of three main 
components: bilateral (up to 65 per cent of financial allocations), multi-
country (up to 30 per cent of financial allocations) and cross-border 
(up to 5 per cent of financial allocations). 
For the period of 2014-2020, for all ENI-CBC programmes in the 
eastern and southern neighbourhood, the EU has allocated from €489 
million to €598 million (the final allocation will depend on the mid-term 
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review for 2018-2020). However, this sum is doubled by the ERDF funds, 
which finance participation of EU member states in CBC programmes 
with neighbours. As a result, total EU’s financial resources available for 
CBC programmes amount to €1.2 billion. Of this sum, total contributions 
for the CBC programmes with the EaP states amount to €465 million. 
ENI-CBC, which is a special component for financing cross-
border cooperation, is operationally structured in 3 overarching 
strategic objectives and 11 more detailed thematic objectives. The 
general priority areas of CBC concern fostering economic and social 
development of border regions by improving the local level situation 
in good governance, public health, security, business cooperation, 
education, environmental protection and security.  
ENI-CBC strategic objectives 
• promotion of economic and social development in regions on 
both sides of common borders; 
• tackling common challenges in environment, public health, 
safety and security; 
• promotion of better conditions and modalities for 
ensuring the mobility of persons, goods and capital. 
ENI-CBC thematic objectives
1. Business and SME development
2. Support to education, research, technological development 
and innovation
3. Promotion of local culture and preservation of historical heritage
4. Promotion of social inclusion and fight against poverty
5. Support to local and regional good governance
6. Environmental protection, and climate change mitigation and 
adaptation
7. Improvement of accessibility to the regions, development of 
sustainable and climate-proof transport and communication 
networks and systems
8. Common challenges in the field of safety and security
9. Promotion of and cooperation on sustainable energy and energy 
security
10. Promotion of border management border security and mobility
11. Other areas not listed above likely to have a substantial cross-
border impact (case by case justification required)
Source: European Commission, European External Action Service, 
Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 2014-
2020, Programming document for EU support to ENI Cross-Border 
Cooperation (2014-2020).
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CBC programmes are implemented by joint operational 
programmes. Each of joint operational programmes defines a set 
of objectives for common activities across border in a multiannual 
perspective.  Currently, the EU finances the implementation of 12 land-
border, 1 sea-crossing and 4 sea-basin programmes in the whole EU’s 
neighbourhood. Of the above programmes, the EaP countries are 
covered by five land-border and two sea-basin programmes.
CBC activities in practice
In practice, ENI-CBC projects concern a variety of very specific 
issues, relevant to the needs of local and regional communities that 
stimulate contacts and cooperation across borders.
An important area is the development of infrastructure at the local 
and regional level. A large part of projects refers to improving border 
infrastructure in order to facilitate people-to-people contacts across 
borders, e.g. improvement of the border-crossing transport infrastructure 
and equipment at border controls. Projects of this kind have been 
implemented along all the EU border with the EaP states. An example 
could be a project implemented on Lithuanian-Belarusian border, which 
aimed at adjusting facilities to the EU border management standards 
and ensuring more effective and reliable check and identification of 
travellers by installing the new mobile and stationary equipment and 
software at 12 border crossing points. 
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List of ENI-CBC Programmes involving EaP countries, 2014-2020
Land border programmes
Latvia/Lithuania/Belarus
Poland/Belarus/Ukraine
Hungary/Slovakia/Romania
/Ukraine
Romania/Moldova
Romania/Ukraine
Sea-crossing programme
Italy/Tunisia
Sea-basin programmes
Baltic Sea Region
Black Sea
Mediterranean
Mid-Atlantic
Source European Commission, European External Action Service, Programming 
of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) - 2014-2020, Programming 
document for EU support to ENI Cross-Border Cooperation (2014-2020).
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Another area of cross-border cooperation refers to the development 
of public infrastructure and cooperation in order to provide better 
services to local communities in various fields, e.g. health care, education, 
social inclusion, cultural cooperation. This can be illustrated by a project 
aimed at development of an alternative pre-school education system in 
rural communities in Poland-Ukrainian border regions. Another example 
is establishing cooperation between regional children hospitals in the 
Hungarian and Ukrainian border region area. 
Strengthening public administration capacity at the local level 
is another important field, where CBC projects are implemented. A 
project designed to reinforce the administrative capacities of local 
authorities and bodies in the energy efficiency sector in the Black  Sea 
region illustrates this point clearly. The project has been implemented 
by local authorities from Romania, Greece, Armenia, Moldova, Ukraine 
and Turkey, and has been financed by the Black Sea Basin ENI-CBC 
programme.
Moreover, CBC projects support the development of business 
activities, labour markets and small and medium enterprises at the 
local level. An example is a project with the purpose of establishing 
a sustainable network of organisations co-operating in the field of 
development of franchising, which should contribute to facilitating faster 
economic growth and business co-operation in Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus 
cross-border region. Many of the projects in all EU-EaP bordering 
regions are related to development of local tourism.
Another area of CBC concerns environmental protection and 
natural reserves management. Various projects dealing with these 
issues have been implemented in all ENI-CBC programmes. This can be 
seen, for example, in a project devoted to cross-border improvement 
of solid municipal waste management (i.e. sustainable municipal water 
management) in the Republic of Moldova, Romania and Ukraine.
And, finally, a very important area of cross-border cooperation 
is combating natural disasters and crime prevention. This kind of 
projects usually involve deepening cooperation and establishing close 
coordination of actions between responsible structures and services, 
i.e. firefighters, police, rescue and emergency services etc. 
Conclusions
The EU applies cross-border cooperation as a useful instrument 
in the implementation of its various policies and strategies, including 
the European Neighbourhood Policy, which covers the countries of 
Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Southern Mediterranean. For the 
EU, CBC is a very important tool used in building good and deep 
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relations with direct EU’s neighbours, which aims to secure and stabilise 
the Union’s close ring of partners and, at the same time, to overcome 
the barriers that hamper the daily lives of local communities in border 
regions. CBC programmes also aim at supporting local development 
in partner countries and enhance their opportunities to develop close 
cooperation links with the EU and EU’s partners.
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Parliamentary Elections with Flavour 
of Local Elites
Archil Zhorzholiani
Abstract
This article focuses on the way parliamentary elections are held 
in Georgia. The recent changes in the election code which were 
proposed to ensure a better territorial representation in the Parliament 
will not change the status quo. The system privileges local elites and 
usually works in favour of ruling parties. The citizens are either unaware 
of their majoritarian MP’s activities in the parliament or lack confidence 
in their activities. The article provides possible scenarios for a change 
of this system.
Parliamentary Elections in Georgia
On 8 October 2016, over 800 candidates ran for 73 majoritarian 
Member of Parliament (MP) seats in the parliament of Georgia 
(საქართველოს პარლამენტის 2016 წლის 8 ოქტომბრის არჩევნებისათვის 
რეგისტრირებული მაჟორიტარი კანდიდატები, 2016). Each seat 
represents a single-member district under majoritarian system where 
candidates have to win over 50 percent of votes in order to be an 
outright winner in the first round. The rest of the 77 seats were contested 
via proportional party-list system.
 
The majoritarian and proportional system has been in place 
in Georgia for over a decade but there has always been a debate 
regarding its change. Reasons argued for this change were various, 
but in general they were related to a biased majoritarian electoral 
system that usually functioned in favour of the ruling parties. By the 
end of 2015, amendments were made in the organic law on “Election 
Code of Georgia” (საქართველოს ორგანულ კანონში „საქართველოს 
საარჩევნო კოდექსი“ ცვლილების შეტანის შესახებ, 2015). However, this 
was considered insufficient and the process of legislative change 
encountered heated resistance from the opposition groups. The main 
request was to entirely abolish the majoritarian system as it was promised 
in the pre-election campaign of the current ruling party – the Georgian 
Dream. In response, the ruling coalition proposed modifying the 
electoral districts and relatively equalizing the number of voters in each 
district, as well as raising the threshold of winning votes from 30 to 50 
percent for the candidates in the first round of elections. This proposal 
actually changed the boundaries of majoritarian electoral districts which 
previously coincided with the municipal borders in Georgia, encouraging 
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majoritarian MPs’ intervention in the local affairs and negative effects 
over local self-governing (municipal) bodies. The Georgian Dream also 
gave promises to the voters related to the local authority competencies 
and later on exerted pressure on the local authorities to act according 
to their own priorities (International Society for Fair Elections and 
Democracy, 2013). 
Although recent 
changes in the 
election code have 
modified electoral 
district boundaries 
in the majority of 
municipalities, it 
is still too early to 
predict whether 
this practice will 
be rectified. Based 
on these changes 
more electoral 
districts were introduced in the bigger cities (e.g. Tbilisi, Batumi, Kutaisi) 
and some less populated municipalities were merged into one electoral 
district. 
 
Meanwhile, recent pre-election campaign ran again with the 
majoritarian candidates going around their districts, meeting potential 
voters and giving promises of variousnature. At the polls, voters usually 
cast their votes by choosing a party and without knowing much about 
the majoritarian candidates. They merely select the same number on 
the voting paper for the majoritarian candidates as for the party. An 
opinion poll from 2015 conducted by the Caucasus Research and 
Resource Center (Thornton & Sichinava, 2015) proves this further. 
58 per cent of respondents did not know who their majoritarian 
candidate in the Parliament was (Figure 1). 95 per cent of respondents 
stated that they had never addressed their MP or their office, and 97 
per cent had never been contacted by their district majoritarian MP 
or their office since October 2012 elections (Ibid pp. 44-45). Not only 
the voters, but even fellow MPs rarely see some of their majoritarian 
colleagues in the parliament. In 2015, the Chairman of the Parliament 
publicly criticized his colleagues for their excessive absences from 
sessions and published a list of top ten MPs who rarely appeared at the 
office (უსუფაშვილმა 10 ყველაზე გამცდენი პარლამენტარი დაასახელა, 
2015). Eight MPs on the list were majoritarian MPs. 
Flavour of Elites
Majoritarian MPs’ political background and backstage ties should 
be the subject of interest. Majoritarian MPs are usually perceived as 
Parliamentary Elections with Flavour of Local Elites
Source: Thornton & Sichinava, 2015.
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parties’ “puppets” in the parliament. The voters rarely see them after 
the elections and they tend not to keep the promises they have made 
before being elected. The pre-election promises frequently refer to 
local issues that have to be handled by local governments rather than by 
MPs in the national parliament. Thus, these promises are empty from the 
very start. But the leading parties usually find nominations rather easily 
and these nominees are frequently representatives of local elites. These 
candidates usually advance their own interests more willingly than their 
constituency’s. But at the same time they maintain their loyalty to the 
political force dominating in the parliament. Referring back to the list 
of parliamentary session absentees mentioned above, the top person 
on the list was a majoritarian MP from Bolnisi municipality. According to 
his official biography (პარლამენტარები, 2012) he managed Georgia’s 
biggest mining company until 2008 before joining the parliament for 
the first term. Another majoritarian MP from the same list was actually 
elected to the parliament from Khobi municipality in 2012 with the 
backing of the former ruling party. However, later in the parliament his 
loyalty shifted towards the prevailing Georgian Dream coalition. This 
year he was re-nominated as a majoritarian candidate for the recent 
elections in the same district, but later on he recalled his nomination and 
announced his intention to return to the business activities (გოდერძი 
ბუკია მაჟორიტარობის კანდიდატობაზე უარს ამბობს და ბიზნესს 
უბრუნდება, 2016). Another prominent case is the MP number six from 
the same absentees list, a majoritarian MP from Tetritskaro municipality. 
This person is considered to be one of the most affluent individuals in 
Georgia. According to the Transparency International Georgia, he is 
the owner of the Georgian Industrial Group (one of the largest industrial 
groups in Georgia), owns an offshore company on Marshal Islands and 
is a shareholder of another offshore company in Cyprus (De Sloover & 
Huter, 2011). It has to be noted that he also changed his political loyalty 
after 2012 elections and stepped down as a member of the former 
ruling party. 
Is the System Worth Keeping?
These are just three prominent cases from the former parliament 
who had as their voter base three rather poor and rural municipalities. 
If researched further, more cases of a similar type could certainly be 
identified. Even majoritarian MPs, who were a great deal more active in 
the parliament and were in good standing with the general public, have 
recognized disadvantages of the system. One of the majoritarian MPs 
stated: “I was a majoritarian MP and it was a really hard job. These people 
were addressing me on all issues, whether it was within my competence 
or not. But I carried on with adoption of new laws in the parliament…” 
(პროპორციული სიები მაჟორიტარულის ნაცვლად – გამოწვევა საარჩევნო 
სისტემის ცვლილებისთვის, 2015). Consequently, it seems logical that 
the population expresses growing distrust of politicians in the parliament 
(Figure 2). Though the voters elected individual MPs at the polls, the 
majority still thought that the MPs would not represent their interests 
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in the parliament and would pursue their personal interests as well as 
follow the party leadership’s directives most of the time. This system 
leaves voters with no choice for the entire four years’ term until they can 
elect new MPs again.
Apart from the political standpoint, efficiency of this system raises 
certain questions as well. It is a fact that elections cost money and 
majoritarian system requires additional resources for all 73 electoral 
districts every four years (or sometimes for interim elections too).  It 
seems inefficient to keep such a high number of unproductive MPs, with 
relatively high salaries, in the parliament for four years. Moreover, MPs 
are entitled to special pensions once they reach retirement age. There 
are 677 retired MPs that receive approximately 250 percent higher 
pension than a regular retiree in Georgia and this number is constantly 
increasing. It already costs Georgian taxpayers roughly EUR 1.8 million 
annually to pay pensions to the retired majoritarian MPs (ხარაზიშვილი, 
2016). 
Considering the level of trust of population in the parliament, 
the effectiveness of the institution and the prospects for change, it is 
logical to conclude that the entire system needs reforming. So why not 
start with the most redundant part of it, represented by the majoritarian 
system? 
Parliamentary Elections with Flavour of Local Elites
1
Source: Thornton & Sichinava, 2015.
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Change Is Needed - Recommendations
When adopting the recent changes in the election code, the ruling 
coalition pledged to support the abolishment of majoritarian system for 
2020 elections. This will require a constitutional amendment with the 
support of at least 2/3 of MP votes in the parliament. 
It is interesting to consider possible scenarios and prospective 
position of new majoritarian MPs in the parliament. These MPs are rather 
unlikely to be keen to abolish the system without any possible options 
for them to to retain political influence. There can be several basic 
options for consideration:
I. Possibly the best case scenario would be to abolish the 
majoritarian system altogether and, accordingly, decrease the 
total number of MPs in the parliament to 77 (total number of 
MPs  - 73 Majoritarian MPs = 77 proportionally elected MPs);  
 
II. Another scenario could be the abolishment of the 
majoritarian system and converting the entire system into a 
proportional system while maintaining the current 150 seats 
in the parliament. This would still leave a higher chance for 
politicians to access the parliament. This model would have 
higher chances of gaining support from the majoritarian MPs;  
III. An introduction of regional proportional electoral system in 
parallel with the national proportional system is another option. 
It would merge several single-member majoritarian districts into 
regional districts and would allow parties to put up separate 
proportional lists of candidates corresponding to the number 
of amalgamated single-member districts. Compared to the first 
option above, this model would also have better chances of 
support from the majoritarian MPs, as it would still allow them to 
run for the parliament;
IV. The last scenario is an introduction of a citizens’ distrust 
mechanism, allowing a constituency to recall its majoritarian MP. 
But this would simply be a modification of the existing system 
without much impact on the entire parliamentary electoral 
structure. 
The first three options may also have a significant positive impact on 
local (municipal) self-governing entities, as they would not have to deal 
with the claims of majoritarian MPs thereby further strengthening their 
discretion in local affairs and stimulating local democracy by properly 
exercising local self-governance principles. 
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Updating strategy for Luhansk region 
development: changes and challenges in 
consequence of the armed conflict and 
occupation
Inna Semenenko
Abstract
The Luhansk region has lost significant resources and capacities 
because of the partial occupation, antiterrorist operations and internal 
migration and has become one of the most vulnerable regions in Ukraine 
economically, socially and politically. The policy brief shows the main 
changes in the economic and social life of the region caused by the 
military conflict. The region adopted a 10 years development strategy.  
However, it needs a brand new strategy, which will take into account 
economic and political crisis, radical change of strategic foreign 
partners, transformation from an industrial region into an agricultural 
one; and constant tensions along the administrative line between 
the occupied areas and territories under Ukrainian authorities. The 
principal components of the strategy should include development 
of the agricultural sector, chemical and petrochemical industry, 
energy security support, infrastructure restoration and investments by 
international organizations and funds. 
Introduction
The Luhansk region was one of the most industrially developed 
regions in Ukraine. It was in the top ten of the regions of Ukraine in 
terms of gross regional product   (Valovoy vnutrennyy product 2016). 
The conflict, which started in Ukraine in 2013-2014, resulted in the split 
of the country and occupation of almost half of the region’s territory. 
As a result, the Luhansk region lost whole industries, infrastructure 
facilities, investments, jobs, which negatively influenced the economy 
of the region itself and Ukraine as a whole. The social effects of the 
conflict were also significant and the living standards declined as a 
consequence of forced internal migration. 
The occupation and antiterrorist operations are the main reasons 
behind the changes in the Luhansk region economy, production 
structure and social situation. These changes set new priorities in 
regional development, such as transformation of the region from an 
industrial into agricultural one, a change of strategic foreign partners, 
development of small and medium enterprises and entrepreneurship, 
restoration of damaged infrastructure and support of energy security. 
Thus, the Luhansk region needs a new development strategy, which will 
take into account the current situation.
Updating strategy for Luhansk region development
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Economic effects of the conflict
2014 was a crucial year for Ukraine and for the Luhansk region in 
particular because of the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of 
territories in the east of Ukraine. The Luhansk region has lost significant 
resources and capacities caused by occupation, antiterrorist operations 
and migration inside the country, and has become one of the most 
vulnerable - economically, socially and politically insecure regions in 
Ukraine.
The conflict has significantly affected the economy and social 
situation of the part of the Luhansk region which remains under the 
control of Kyiv.  At present, about 45 per cent of the region’s territory 
is under occupation which has affected its economic performance.  
The gross regional product decreased from 55,108 billion UAH in 2013 
to 31,393 billion UAH in 2014 (this is a 54 per cent decrease in one 
year). In 2013 industrial production was 72,657 billion UAH and only 
33,599 billion in 2014 (a 53.76 per cent decrease in one year). In 2015 
the industrial output amounted only to 13-34 per cent of that of the 
2014.  Economic efficiency of business operations in Luhansk region 
decreased by 18.1 per cent in 2014 as compared with 2012. The number 
of operating enterprises has also decreased significantly (see table 1).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Kilkist pidpryiemstv 
Luhanskoii oblasti za iih rozmiramy za vydamy ekonomichnoii diialnosti 
u 2013 and 2014.
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Table 1 – Change in the number of enterprises in the Luhansk region
among them
big
middle
small
industry
construction
trade
transport
Number of enterprises 
in the Luhansk region
Number of enterprises in the Luhansk region
Total: 11385 3233 -72%
-68%28
660
10697
1508
1889
1049
3215
6131 49
716
248
930
485
2972
252
9
-62%
-72%
-38%
-74%
-76%
-78%
-76%
2013 2014 Change
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According to the data, the total number of enterprises in the Luhansk 
region decreased in 2014 by 72 per cent over the previous year. The 
production sectors that suffered most were the industry, construction, 
trade and transport. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries suffered less: 62 
per cent of enterprises continued to function in 2014, thus changing the 
production structure of the region’s economy.
Social effects of the conflict
Eleven out of fourteen cities of oblast significance9 in the Luhansk 
region are currently not under the control of the Ukrainian government 
(Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 2014). The government, police, 
educational, medical, social and other institutions and organizations 
moved from the occupied territory to the cities and villages under the 
control of the Ukrainian government. These authorities and institutions 
often operate on the premises of local authorities, businesses, hospitals 
etc. with limited resources and capacities, which leads to conflicts 
between the local and internally displaced organizations. 
The standard of living has declined as a result of forced internal 
migration. By 1 January 2016, about 250,000 internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) registered in the Luhansk region. At the same time, the 
available housing decreased more than threefold, from 55 mln m2 in 
2013 to 17.7 mln m2 in 2014 (Zhytlovyi fond u Luhanskii oblasti 2016). The 
number of families and singles included in housing records decreased 
by more than five times, and the number of families and singles who 
received state funded accommodation in 2014 dropped to 56 from 
650 in 2013 ((Zhytlovyi fond u Luhanskii oblasti 2016).
The inflation rate was 25,2% in 2014 and 38,8% in 2015 (Indeksy 
spozhyvchyh tsin na tovary ta poslugy 2016). Thus despite the nominal 
wages growth the real wages have been decreasing since 2014. By 
1 January 2015, wage arrears grew by 825.7 per cent (compared to 
1 January 2014) (Zaborgovanist iz vyplaty zarobitnoyi platy u 2000-
2016 rokah 2016). In total wage arrears amounted to 364.561 million 
UAH, of which 301.9 million were by the enterprises, which operated on 
the occupied area (Zaborgovanist iz vyplaty zarobitnoyi platy u 2000-
2016 rokah 2016). The real income of the population in 2014 amounted 
to 67.6% of the corresponding period of the previous year (Dohody 
naselennia Luhanskoii oblasti 2016).
9 Cities which due to their economic significance have the municipality statues as well as the 
statues of separate rayon within the oblast.
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A new strategy for economic growth and development 
is needed
The occupation and antiterrorist operation are the main reasons 
behind the changes in the Luhansk region economy, social situation 
and other spheres. These changes set new priorities and benchmarks 
in regional development. The region has already had several 
strategies for its economic and social development (Luhansk Oblast 
State Administration 2016). One of them is the strategy for regional 
development covering the period until the year 2015, approved by the 
Luhansk Regional Council in 2008. In 2015, the new strategy for regional 
development, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in 2014, 
replaced the previous one. However, the Luhansk region still needs a new 
strategy, one that would take into account the economic and political 
crisis, a radical change of strategic foreign partners, a transformation 
from an industrial region into an agricultural one, and constant tensions 
of social and political situation on the border between the occupied 
and Ukrainian territories and adjoining areas.
The new strategy should foster economic growth, which focuses 
initially on the development of the industries left on Ukrainian territories, 
and a restoration of infrastructure destroyed during the antiterrorist 
operation. 
Before the conflict, the Luhansk region was an industrial region with 
Russia and other post-Soviet republics as the main strategic partners. 
The industries in the region included coal-mining, machine-building 
industry, metallurgy, construction material production, chemical industry, 
consumer goods manufacturing and food processing industry. The 
biggest plants, which belonged to these industries, and the majority of 
coal mines remained on the occupied territory. These industrial plants 
and factories formed a significant part of gross regional product and 
provided the population with jobs. The rest of the territory of the Luhansk 
region hosts mostly agricultural industry: farmlands, animal breeding, part 
of chemical industry and part of consumer goods manufacturing. Grain, 
leguminous crops, autumn sown cereal, sunflower, corn, vegetables 
and forage crops are grown on farmlands. Animal breeding includes 
great cattle, swine breeding, part of poultry industry, goat and sheep 
breeding. The chemical, petrochemical and consumer goods industries 
are located primarily near the three oblast cities located close to the 
border between the occupied and Ukrainian territories: Severodonetsk 
(which at present is the administrative centre of the Luhnsk oblast), 
Lysychansk and Rubizhne. They are situated less than 40 km from the 
dividing line.
Agricultural sector 
The strategy should address the main problems of the agricultural 
sector in the Luhansk region, i.e. the loss of commodity markets and 
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food processing industries, poor logistics and infrastructure for sale 
of agricultural products, devaluation of national currency and lack of 
credit facilities to farmers. The community markets and food processing 
industries remained on the occupied territories with higher population 
density. Transportation of agricultural produce to other regions is 
complicated considering the ruined roads and railway to the only 
elevator left in the region, as this increases the price of agricultural 
produce and forces the farmers to sell it at lower prices (Kostusieva 
2016). Thus, the strategic objectives for development of agriculture in 
the region are to restore the roads and to build a railway to the elevator, 
to create and introduce special terms for crediting farmers and other 
favourable conditions to increase the quantity of small businesses in 
agriculture and food processing industry.
Strategic objectives for chemical and petrochemical 
industry
Development of chemical and petrochemical industry is also 
among priorities for the strategy, as the existing enterprises have 
already formed an oversize industrial hub, which can export unique 
goods to other regions in Ukraine and abroad, and provide a significant 
number of jobs. However, today the chemical and petrochemical plants 
operating in the Luhansk region under Kyiv’s control are not working at 
full capacity. For example, PJSC AZOT OSTCHEM, one of the biggest 
chemical holdings in Ukrainethat produced chemical fertilizers and 
provided jobs for more than 6.5 thousand people in Severodonetsk, 
now works only several days a week, and produces only certain kinds 
of fertilizers (PrAT 2016). An oil-refining plant in Lysychansk that could 
provide 3000 jobs stands idle. The reasons for the downtime include 
an absence of energy resources, absence of transportation means 
for hazardous and explosive materials, the political situation and the 
conflict itself. The conflict has led to the destruction of infrastructure and 
lack of energy resources. The only railway line remaining in the region 
under Kyiv’s control is used to carry passengers and cannot be used to 
transport hazardous and explosive chemical products. The proximity 
of the plants which produce hazardous materials to the area between 
the occupied and Ukrainian territories and the territory where military 
activities take place, is a threat to security of the plants’ operations and 
to the safety of the local population. The conflict has also led to the 
backstairs influence of blocking the work of Lysychansk refining plant, 
as its owner is Rosneft, a Russian oil company.
Maximization of chemical and petrochemical processes utilization 
requires a stabilization of political situation in the country and assurance 
of energy security in the region. However, these are primarily the tasks 
of the government policy rather than regional policy, and should be 
part of a strategy for the whole country’s development. In the long 
term, fulfillment of these tasks will, in its turn, attract investments into the 
region and contribute to its economic growth. 
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Energy security support and infrastructure restoration 
Energy security of the Luhansk region is important not only for industry 
development, but also for the restoration of transport infrastructure and 
creation of new railways, roads, traffic intersections, energy and water 
supply, public transportation etc. Only one power plant is operating 
in the Luhansk region. This plant is situated in the combat zone – only 
15 km from the occupied territories. It is not working at full capacity 
because of destructions, and provides energy supply for the whole 
Luhansk region, including the occupied territory. The capacities of the 
power plant are not enough to power new infrastructure such as high-
speed rail system.
Restoration of the industrial, transport, market and social 
infrastructure is an important component of the strategy for the 
Luhansk region development. It contributes to an efficient functioning 
of production processes, market activity, quality of social services etc. 
Migration of people inside the region has increased the pressure on 
social infrastructure, such as hospital and educational establishments, 
which require additional space and finances. Local authorities, Pension 
and Social Funds, the Savings Bank of Ukraine and other institutions 
provide services not only for the local population, but also for the 
internally displaced persons. The size of the institutions and number of 
their personnel are not sufficient to successfully handle the number of 
people who need and require the services. Thus, the population needs 
creation of additional infrastructure and jobs.
Role of international organizations
A development strategy for the Luhansk region should also take 
into account the support for small enterprises and entrepreneurship, 
as small and medium size enterprises provide a significant part of the 
regional sales volume and employment for the local population and 
IDPs, and can quickly react to the changing demand by supplying new 
products and services to the market. Provision of financial resources and 
credits, vocational guidance and retraining, legal support, consulting 
and assistance are important elements of the policy. Educational 
establishments, government employment bureau and international 
organizations and funds provide some of these elements. International 
organizations and funds such as UNDP, IOM, Mercy Corps and USAID have 
already organized retraining courses and entrepreneurship counselling 
for IDPs and local population, and provided successful trainees with 
financial resources for opening own businesses. 
Next to the unemployment, the main problems for the population 
are the lack of housing accommodations (for IDPs) and decrease of 
income (a significant part of which is spent on rent). There are no 
effective governmental programs in Ukraine that would foresee housing 
construction for IDPs. Such programs, together with mortgage programs, 
are important for regional development. They will prevent brain drain 
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or return to the occupied territory as a consequence of being unable 
to settle on the territory under Kyiv’s control. Mortgage programs may 
attract government finances as well as resources from international 
donors.
International organizations and funds such as UNDP, USAID, IOM, 
Danish Refugee Council, Polish Center for International Aid, National 
Red Cross Society and others play a significant role in both economic 
and social development of the Luhansk region. They try to foster 
implementation of changes, directed to development of civil society, 
promoting European values, reforms and good governance support. 
Moreover, they share their international experience and teach new 
methodologies; they co-finance the restoration of destroyed facilities 
and creation of new businesses, hubs, associations etc., they work with 
people who suffered during the armed conflict. Additionally, international 
organizations and funds create jobs for the local population and IDPs 
inside these organizations and funds. Another important direction of 
work carried out by international organizations and funds consists of 
attempts for cohesion and reconciliation of local population and IDPs as 
well as settling conflicts between different population groups, building 
relationships and dialogues.
Conclusion
Thus, the strategy should solve the main problems for the Luhansk 
region development, which arouse as a result of the occupation of a 
significant part of its territory and the antiterrorist operations. Peace 
and political stability are prerequisites for sustainable development of 
the region, and this is the key task for the Ukrainian government. 
To sum up, the new strategy for the Luhansk region’s development 
should include 8 elements: 
• Development of capacities and potential industries remaining on the 
Ukrainian territory; 
• Support for energy security of the Luhansk region;
• Prevention of further capital drain and infrastructure destruction; 
• Putting into practice international experience, encouraging present 
activities and support of international funds and organizations; 
• Development of the agricultural sector; 
• Support for small enterprises and entrepreneurship; 
• Contributing to the evolution of civil society institutions and increasing 
their role in business development; 
• Settling conflicts of interests between central and local public 
authorities, public authorities and business, public authorities and civil 
society, civil society and business.
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